This article examines the circumstances under which CSR initiatives facilitate and/or constrain labor agency in GPNs. Using a case study of Nike's CSR approach in the football manufacturing industry of Pakistan, we explore how the CSR measures advocated in a new, emerging policy paradigm on CSR in GPNs affect labor agency at Nike's main football supplier factory in Pakistan.
Introduction
The outsourcing of products and services from developed countries to developing countries and economies in transition is one of the dominant features of the current phase of economic globalization (Wills 2009 ). On the one hand, the outsourcing of production and services has created millions of job in developing countries and economies in transition, substantially raising the incomes of many impoverished workers and their families. On the other hand, outsourcing has also been associated with poor working conditions, industrial accidents, and environmental pollution in export-oriented industries in developing countries where the enforcement of national labor and environmental laws has either been lax or absent (Mayer and Pickles 2011) . Since the early 1990s, these developments have led to widespread concerns that an international social and environmental race-to-the-bottom might be occurring. Critical media reports, NGOs, and trade union activism have thus compelled many internationally branded companies to adopt social and environmental guidelines -so-called codes of conduct -and require that their suppliers in developing countries abide by these guidelines (Seidman 2007) . In theory, suppliers that complied with these guidelines were to be rewarded with more business while suppliers that did not live up to the requirements stipulated in these guidelines were to be excluded from the global production networks (GPNs) of leading international brands (Locke et al. 2009 ).
There is now an increasing awareness that the implementation of such guidelines might have positive effects on tangible issues such as the reduction of overtime and the payment of minimum wages at supplier factories. However, they do little or nothing to improve the ability of workers to freely join trade unions and bargain collectively in order to ensure improvements in their working conditions (ETI 2006, Barrientos and Smith 2007) . Hence, in recent practitioner-oriented literature, there is now talk of moving towards a new approach to working with corporate social responsibility (CSR) 1 in global supply chains that will ensure better social outcomes at the bottom of GPNs in developing counties (Posthuma and Nathan 2010) . One suggestions, for instance, is that better coordination between brands' purchasing and CSR departments may help to avoid a situation in which sourcing personnel demand constant price declines while the CSR staff of the same corporation demand that suppliers increase workers' wages (Oxfam 2010) . Capacity building in the area of human resource management is also seen as a way of improving the interaction between management and workers in developing country suppliers (Locke et al 2009) . In addition, training of workers may heighten their awareness of their rights under national labor laws and the brands' code of conduct. Finally, instead of conducting only one, two, or three-day 'snapshot' social audits of developing country factories, brands are now being encouraged to work together with local NGOs and trade unions to ensure that work conditions at production sites are monitored all year round (IDH 2009) .
In this article, our main aim is to explore whether this new approach to working with CSR in GPNs will enable or constrain workers' ability to collectively organise and demand improvements in their work conditions. In other words, under what circumstances do the CSR initiatives of internationally branded companies facilitate or constrain workers' agency in export-oriented industries in developing countries? The literature on labor agency in GPNs has usually conceived of labor agency as workers acting collectively through trade unions with the aim of defending their rights and improving their conditions of work (Cumbers et al. 2008, Riisgaard 2009, Riisgaard and  Hammer 2011, Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011) . As Riisgaard and Hammer (2011) point out, however, the ability to construct associational power is ultimately driven as much by local and national institutional context -often termed the 'horizontal' dimension -as it is by GPN structures -the 'vertical' dimension. More recently, labor agency in GPNs has also been understood in terms of unorganised workers opting in and out of particular work forms and kinds of employment. In this literature, the focus has been on how the decision-making processes of workers in relation to their choice of work form/occupation has been facilitated or constrained by their embeddedness in local socio-economic contexts (Carswell and De Neve 2013, Lund-Thomsen, 2013) . In this article, we contribute to this emerging literature on labor agency in GPNs by investigating the circumstances under which the CSR policies of internationally branded companies, in this case Nike, may facilitate or undermine worker agency at the level of supplier factories. We believe that our article is the first to explore how measures advocated in the new approach to working with CSR in GPNs described above (policy coordination between sourcing and CSR personnel, improved human resource management practices, training of workers, and year-round monitoring of work conditions at supplier sites) affect labor agency in GPNs. In line with recent research, however, we find that worker agency can only ultimately be understood in relation to the local institutional and regulatory context. such an extent that they organised strikes and were partly successful in having their demands met.
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, we develop an analytical framework that conceptualises the circumstances under which internationally branded companies facilitate and/or constrain workers' agency in export-oriented industries in developing countries through the use of the new approach to working with CSR in GPNs. We then briefly introduce the methodology than underpins this study. Our empirical analysis is subsequently divided into two sections. We first introduce the Sialkot cluster and Nike's role within it before exploring the impacts of CSR imperatives transmitted through the vertical dimension of the production networks on the potential for labor agency. Second, we explore the role of local and national Pakistan-based actorsconstituting the horizontal dimension -arguing that the role of these actors is crucial in shaping worker agency and ultimately the effectiveness of Nike's recent interventions from the worker perspective. Finally, the conclusion outlines the main findings and the policy implications of our analysis.
Analytical framework: conceptualising labor agency in global production networks
Our analytical framework seeks to explain how a multinational company's sourcing and CSR policies may facilitate and/or constrain labor agency at the level of local supplier factories in developing countries. We broadly place ourselves within the GPN approach that conceptualises how goods and services are designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, consumed, and recycled on a world-wide basis (Coe et al. 2008) . The GPN approach is often discussed in relation to two other strands in the literature on GPNs. In the early 1990s, the term global commodity chains (GCCs) was coined to understand how global production systems were organized (Gereffi 1994 ).
However, as global production was increasingly involving the manufacturing of high-tech products and services, the term commodity was replaced with the idea of global value chains (GVCs) since value addition at each stage of the production chain was crucial to global economic organization.
Against the backdrop of the GCC/GVC literatures, the so-called Manchester school of economic geographers developed an alternative conception of GPNs. Whereas the GVC literature mainly focused on inter-firm relations, the GPN approach emphasized that a broader network of actors including nation states, international organizations, trade unions, NGOs, and communities played a crucial role in the organization of GPNs. In addition, whereas GVC literature has tended to look mostly at governance dimension of GPNs (i.e. power in inter-firm relationships), a central project of the GPN approach has been to incorporate the embeddedness of GPNs in particular local socioeconomic and socio-cultural environments that play key roles in structuring GPNs from the bottomup (Henderson et al. 2002 , Coe et al. 2008 .
In this article, our use of the GPN approach reflects our wish to explore how CSR and labor agency are embedded in wider networks of relationships. These include not only global lead firms and suppliers in developing countries but also other actors such as international and national regulatory authorities, international NGOs, trade unions, and the media. We see these wider networks as playing crucial roles in determining what is produced, where, when, in which quantity, and at what price in GPNs. In addition, we are concerned with how the relationship between CSR and labor in GPNs is embedded in local socio-economic contexts. Hence, both formal (in the form of national laws and implementation agencies) and informal institutions (such as values, norms, and beliefs) are seen as important in structuring the way in which GPNs are governed. This factor also has to be taken into account when analyzing the gains or loses accruing to local firms, contractors, and workers from GPN restructuring, including the kind of restructuring that follows from the implementation of CSR policies in GPNs.
In our analytical framework we also draw a distinction between vertical and horizontal relations in the analysis of GPNs Pritchard 2009, 2010) . We follow Riisgaard and Hammer (2011) in arguing that labor agency within GPNs can only be understood in terms of the intersection of these two dimensions. Through their research on the cut flower and banana sectors, they posit that 'the governance of inter-firm linkages, while crucial in structuring the terrain for labor, is always mediated by the specific social relations of local production and labor control regimes as well as the histories and orientations of the respective actors' (p.183). They argue that the potential for worker agency is shaped by the intersection of three factors: the overall 'drivenness' of the network, whether it is a producer or buyer driven system, and the nature of the local labor control regime.
The vertical dimension of GPN analysis thus has to do with the role that internationally branded firms play in determining the terms of GPN participation for local firms, contractors, and workers.
If orders from international buyers are stable, and if buyers supply workers with a range of CSR benefits including bonus incentives, overtime payments, and social insurance, workers are in a better position to bargain for higher wages and demand more benefits associated with their employment in a local supplier factory (Selwyn 2008 , Oxfam 2010 to their suppliers, this places local producers in a situation where they might not able to run a financially profitable operation during those times when their order books are low (Ruwanpura and Wrigley 2011) . In turn, this might trigger the agency of workers as they realize that they are not provided with the promised CSR benefits.
GPNs also play an important role in determining the scope for labor agency to the extent that international buyers operate with stringent CSR requirements. In instances where these buyers demand strict compliance with such requirements, local manufacturers are likely to be under greater pressure to listen to the demands of the workers they employ (Riisgaard and Hammer 2011) .
Conversely, if local manufacturers are serving international customers that are not concerned about CSR compliance, the scope for workers to have their voices and demands heard is likely to be more constrained. In such instances, workers may have little or no influence in terms of co-determining the conditions under which they labor.
The horizontal dimension, in turn, refers to the local socio-economic and community contexts in which developing country export industries are embedded (Neilson and Pritchard 2010) . In a study of aquaculture unionism in Chile, for example, Oseland et al. (2012) argue that worker agency in GPNs is heavily conditioned by national factors, with three domains being scaled heavily at the national level: the organization of labor networks, the regulation of economic and employment affairs, and the sphere of public discourse about work and its regulation. Similarly, as authors such as Brammer et al (2012) and Gond et al (2011) recognize, CSR is also interpreted and 'translated'
into national contexts where it is embedded in social networks, business associations and political structures. It is within these national contexts that the sourcing and CSR policies of internationally branded buyers play a crucial role in facilitating or undermining labor agency at the 'bottom' of GPNs. Accordingly in the horizontal aspect of our analytical framework we identify four factors that are likely to mediate how the sourcing and CSR policies of internationally branded companies affect the scope for workers' agency in local supplier factories. These are the use of private sector consultants, trade unions, NGOs, and the presence/absence of an independent national media.
First, private sector consultants are often portrayed as requiring high fees for conducting rapid, superficial, and non-participatory audits of supplier factories in developing countries (Auret and Barrientos 2004) . As the consultants tend to be paid by either the international brand or local supplier companies, they are seen as primarily being accountable to and serving the interests of these firms instead of workers in GPNs. In addition, their reports are rarely published in the public realm, which means that it is not possible to independently scrutinize the quality of their work and the performance of individual supplier factories (O'Rourke 2006) . In other words, the use of private sector consultants may be seen as an attempt at substituting traditional forms of industrial relations, with labor rights consultants supposedly 'voicing the concerns of workers' instead of workers jointly organizing themselves and defending their rights vis-à-vis their employers. On a more positive note, other consultants may employ more participatory methods, have greater knowledge of the contextual setting and the native languages of workers, and conduct both on-site and off-site interviews with workers. These worker interviews may highlight labor rights violations at local factories. At least in theory, using more participatory social auditing methods could also help workers in articulating their concerns in ways that might help them collective organize and influence their employers (Auret and Barrientos 2004) .
Second, trade unions have often been highlighted as a key vehicle for strengthening workers agency in GPNs. On the one hand, trade unions provide the means through which workers can articulate their joint interests and engage in collective bargaining vis-à-vis their employers. The rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining are therefore seen as critical in relation to improving workers' scope for influencing their employers. This is also known as 'associational power' (Wright 2000) which arises from the collective organization of workers in trade unions and political parties (Selwyn 2008) . On the other hand, levels of unionization are often low in developing countries, potentially limiting their effectiveness as fora through which workers can jointly organize themselves. Trade unions in developing countries have also been criticized for being male-dominated, sometimes corrupt, and representing the interests of their leaders rather than the workers in whose name they speak. In these circumstances, their potential as a vehicle for articulating workers' demands may be quite limited. However, low levels of associational power do not necessarily translate into low levels of what Wright (2000, p. 962 ) describes as 'structural power', i.e. that which arises out of the strategic position of workers in the production system.
Drawing on the work of Wright, Silver (2003) further subdivides structural power into two subcategories: marketplace bargaining power and workplace bargaining power. The former arises in demand-supply relations, for example in instances where there might be a shortage of skilled labor in particular industries which accordingly increases the bargaining power of workers. Workplace bargaining power has to do with the ability of workers to stop production flows which can have wider spill-lover effects on employment relations (see also Selwyn 2008) . To this, we may add that labor agency is likely to be enhanced if workers labor in a central production site where they might be in a better position to organise themselves, and undermined if workers are situated in dispersed, subcontracted employment units -for example, small-scale workshops or home-based work.
Third, NGOs are also an important factor that may facilitate and/or constrain worker agency in GPNs. On the one hand, the literature on public-private partnerships has emphasized that NGOs' may help in terms of providing knowledge, resources, and context sensitivity to the work of corporations whose operations affect the livelihoods of local communities in developing countries.
In particular, the ability of NGOs to interact with and organize communities in developing countries may provide an opportunity for corporations to improve their relations with local-level stakeholders The final part of our framework deals with the role that local and international media may play in relation to facilitating and/or constraining worker agency in developing country export industries (cf. Oseland et al., 2012) . On the one hand, if the local media is independent of government control in developing countries, news reports may play a key role in highlighting the plight of workers that are engaged in struggles with their employers over their work conditions. Bringing such struggles into the public realm may raise the stakes for their employers. Not only do they risk losing their public legitimacy, but they might also face regulatory action from local authorities and/or losing their international customers if they do not heed their workers' concerns (Tran 2011) . On the other hand, if the local media is tightly controlled by government authorities, press freedom non-existent, and critical journalists persecuted, this is likely to constrain workers' ability to voice their concerns in the public realm. In this way, it may be difficult for workers to form alliances, either domestically or internationally, that might help them in bringing pressure on their employers to rectify their grievances. Hence, local media may be a critical factor in either facilitating and/or constraining worker agency in local supplier firms.
In sum, this paper seeks to make two distinct contributions to the embryonic literature on labor agency in GPNs. First, we seek to evaluate the potential of new modes of CSR transmitted through the 'vertical' dimension of GPNs to facilitate worker agency in developing country suppliers given wider cost and competitive pressures within a context of global economic crisis. Second, while granting worker rights may be an element of such CSR initiatives, their ultimate effectiveness is shaped by the activities of a variety of local and national actors in the production context. Both analytically and empirically, we map out the 'horizontal' elements that codetermine the scope for worker agency in combination with wider GPN dynamics.
A note on methodology
Our article draws upon a comparative study of the work conditions in the football manufacturing The centres would usually consist of a centrally located building or demarcated outdoor space which could either be rented by a contractor, owned by the factory or individual stitchers.
Interviews were undertaken with the sourcing and CSR personnel of leading international buyers from the Sialkot cluster including the international and local representatives of brands such as Nike, Adidas, UK-based Mitre, Danish Select Sports, and alternative brands such as Fairdeal Trading.
These interviews focused on the history of the brands' involvement with the cluster, their perception of the competitive strengths and weaknesses of the cluster, their relationship with individual suppliers, their CSR requirements, and how they monitored the enforcement of these requirements. We then traced their supply chains to Sialkot, interviewing 11 local suppliers, including some suppliers in our sample that supplied footballs to non-branded international buyers in markets in the developing world. These interviews mostly focused on how their business was affected by their buyers' sourcing and CSR requirements, and how they monitored the presence/absence of child labor in their own stitching supply chains. We then took one further step down the supply network, interviewing eight contractors about how they carried out their work, supplying stitchers with panels and thread to stitch footballs and returning the stitched footballs to the factories in the center of Sialkot. Finally, we undertook 51 individual interviews and 11 focus group interviews with stitchers engaged in factory, centre, and home-based football stitching.
Individual interviews focused on football stitchers basic conditions of work including issues such as salary payments, work hours, occupational health and safety, work intensity, and levels of social Silverstar began producing footballs for Nike. The workers had either completed primary or secondary education, allowing them to understand Nike's production and CSR requirements, and were capable of keeping up with Nike's production requirements of having to stitch at least four match balls a day. The work was physically demanding, with each ball sometimes requiring more than 800 individual stitches. Sometimes the football stitchers would also suffer from work-related injuries such as needle pricks, deformed fingers, and backache from long hours of stitching in the same position (Lund-Thomsen 2013). However, the value of their earnings (US$263 a month), while above the minimum wage and the highest offered in the industry, could hardly cover even the most basic amenities required to sustain a family. For example, an estimate of the NGO, the International Labor Rights Forum, indicated that a football stitcher heading a family of five would need PKR 12,000 a month to sustain that family if food, education, electricity/gas, medical, housing, and miscellaneous expenditures were to be covered (ILRF 2010) . Nevertheless, the workers were supposed to be covered by social insurance (old age pension, medical insurance, and a one-off compensation in case they were laid-off).
In our analytical framework, we argued that vertical relations within the production network might be used as a driver for enhancing worker agency. Importantly, the ability of international brands to supply stable order volumes may facilitate the ability of workers to extract higher wages and fringe benefits from their employers. Conversely, if international brands could not provide regular orders to their supplier in the developing world, this may have constrained their ability to negotiate with their employers for improvements in their work conditions. The latter process turned out to be the most important in our case study.
At the time of the research in 2009, the global financial crisis had recently erupted and was affecting the global football manufacturing industry. In practice, Nike was not able to place the order volumes that the factory owner had initially expected (around 300,000 footballs a month).
Instead production levels were down to 60-70,000 balls in June/July 2009. As the volume of orders was low, the factory was 'bleeding'; i.e. not able to make any profits. This placed considerable pressure on Silverstar's owner to reduce the factory's running costs. One way to reduce costs was by laying-off 500-700 workers. According to the local sourcing company, Matrix Sourcing, workers were being paid the full gratuity that Silverstar was required to offer under Pakistan's labor laws.
However, some of the our individual worker and focus group interviews indicated that laid-off workers were not paid their compensation in full; In summarizing this section on vertical relations, we can state that Nike's sourcing policy of reducing orders to Silverstar in mid-2009 had the effect of reducing workers' wages, fringe benefits, and gratuity payments. In order words, it appeared as if Nike's sourcing policy constrained the ability of Silverstar's male workers to extract higher wages and fringe benefits from their employer.
This raises the question of the extent to which Nike' CSR policy might have facilitated the ability of Silverstar's workers to engage in labor agency within this wider macro-economic context. We explore this question in the next section that investigates how Nike's sourcing and CSR policies interacted with the local context of work and employment in Sialkot -the horizontal dimension -in creating particular labor agency outcomes.
Constrained agency? Horizontal relations in Sialkot, Pakistan
In this section, we use the horizontal element of our analytical framework to explore how private sector consultants, trade union activities, NGOs, and national media in Pakistan facilitated and/or constrained labor agency at the Silverstar factory. We start out by looking at the role played by the private sector consultants hired by Nike to monitor the implementation of its production and CSR requirements.
Private Sector Consultants
Our analytical framework highlighted that private sector consultants might play a role in constraining labor agency in circumstances where they were paid to conduct rapid and superficial audits whose results remained unpublished. At the same time, this negative assessment saw such consultants as primarily being accountable to the multinational companies that hire them and not shop-floor workers. However, if private sector consultants were to employ more participatory, worker-centered methods to auditing, these might embody the potential for serving as a channel for raising workers' concerns with their employers and end customers. The Silverstar football stitchers also mentioned that other CSR compliance monitoring teams (i.e not Matrix Sourcing) would sometimes visit the factory. Usually, these consultants would spend time with the factory management of Silverstar before being taken on a tour of the factory accompanied by its management. They would rarely, if ever, directly attempt to speak to the workers. Hence, it appeared as if the visits of these monitors made little, if any, difference to the workers' ability to communicate their concerns related to their work conditions.
"Interviewer: What difference does it [the monitor's visit] make to your work conditions?
Silverstar Stitcher: It does not make any difference to us. We work as a routine. They visit, they watch, and they leave."
In a similar way, some of the Silverstar stitchers indicated that the visits of these monitors might be helpful if the monitors were to speak directly to the workers. However, in practice, this did not happen and monitors tended to speak only to the Silverstar management as the two quotes from different workers illustrate below: In other words, it appears as if the CSR monitoring and audits conducted by private sector consultants in the Silverstar factory did not facilitate the ability of Silverstar's workers to exercise labor agency in Nike's GPN. In fact, as described in the section on 'vertical' relations, some of the male Silverstar workers praised Nike's for its progressive policies towards workers. However, as the workers had no direct line of communication with Nike, they could not formally voice their concerns to the US brand.
Trade Unions
Another factor that might facilitate labor agency in Nike's GPN could be the existence of a local trade union in Silverstar that could help workers to organize collectively and negotiate their demands vis-à-vis the Silverstar management. However, our analytical framework also emphasized that levels of unionization amongst factory-based workers are often very low in developing countries, trade union officials may in reality represent their own or their employers' interest, and are sometimes also corrupt, thus limiting the potential for labor agency in such factories.
The management of Silverstar was against the idea of introducing a trade union in the factory. Silverstar's stitchers.
Non-Governmental Organizations
As argued in our analytical framework, local NGOs may facilitate labor agency at local supplier factories by bringing knowledge, resource, and context sensitivity to the work of corporations whose operations impact on workers and local communities in developing countries. This could occur, for example, through opening a channel of communication between the workers and their end customer, the internationally branded company. However, NGOs may also be co-opted into the worldviews of corporate managers, losing their critical approach and independence in instances where they come to rely on financial contributions from multinational companies to undertake their However, while some workers indicated that they were skeptical of the PILER staff, most of our worker interviews indicated a very high level of awareness of the exact salary levels and fringe benefits that workers were supposed to obtain as part of their employment at the factory. Crucially, some workers indicated that they had achieved this awareness through PILER's training. Now they were able to calculate their exact wage and identify whether they had been paid the right amount or not. One of the workers explained how this worked in practice; organize spontaneous strikes when their wages and fringe benefits were either not paid in full or not paid on time. The leaders of these strikes turned out to be some of the more well-educated workers that were willing to stand up to the Silverstar management and were less afraid of losing their jobs.
In practice, these strikes would involve several workers. For example, in one instance, one of the workers explained how 70-80 workers had filed separate complaints about the manager that was in charge of salary calculations, some of them demanding that he be removed from this position. In another instance, some of the workers explained how they jointly engaged a strike when they discovered that their salaries had not been calculated correctly. Hence, compared to the time when Nike's footballs were stitched in the decentralized stitching centres of Saga Sports in the villages around Sialkot, making it very difficult to organize workers, it appeared as if strikes were now a frequent phenomenon at the Silverstar factory. In other words, it seems that the centralization of football stitching and the training of workers in their rights and duties played a vital role in facilitating labor agency at the Silverstar factory.
National Media
The final part of our analytical framework pointed to the potential of national media in facilitating labor agency at the suppliers of internationally branded companies in developing countries. By highlighting the plight of workers in the public sphere, national media may pressurize local factories to respond positively to workers' demands. However, if freedom of press is lacking, and journalists persecuted by national authorities, this might act as constraint on labor agency at the suppliers of internationally branded companies. The national media in Pakistan has traditionally been controlled been the ruling government whether this was a civilian or a military government.
However, President Musharraf, the former military ruler, decided to liberalize the media laws of Pakistan in 2004. This led to a mushrooming of private television channels out of which the GEO news channel is perhaps the most prominent. One of the workers explained how GEO had played an important role for the workers in terms of having their demands met during one of the strikes. In other words, when workers were aware of their rights under national labor laws and a multinational company's code of conduct, and when they were able to gather together in a central production site, a free national media may enforce the structural power of workers, or more specifically the workplace organizing power to stop production, as publicizing worker unrest through the national media may cause embarrassment for local factories and challenges in relation to their international buyers. This may have implications for the ways in which international brands, NGOs, and trade unions seek to empower workers in GPNs. This is an issue that we touch upon in the conclusion below.
Conclusion: CSR alone is not enough
In this article, we set out to investigate the circumstances in which the CSR policies of internationally branded companies facilitated or undermined workers' agency in export-oriented industries in developing countries. Using the case of Nike's production and CSR model in the Pakistani football manufacturing industry, our analysis has demonstrated that most of the company's production and CSR requirements tended to have a limited impact on facilitating worker agency. In theory, Nike had attempted to coordinate its production and CSR policies by paying a premium price for the footballs it sourced, which would -at least partly -cover its suppliers' added costs of abiding with Nike's code of conduct. However, as Nike was not able to place the envisaged orders, its supplier factory, Silverstar, had to reduce its costs in order to stay afloat. This meant that many of the salary payments including added bonus incentives were not paid in full to the factory's football stitchers in 2009. This severely restrained the scope that workers had for reworking the system in ways that allowed them to extract extra benefits from their participation in Nike's GPN.
At the same time, Nike's use of private sector consultants, the election of shop stewards, and training of workers in their rights under Pakistani labor law and Nike's code of conduct had differential outcomes. Nike's use of private sector consultants appeared to block any possibilities of the workers directly communicating their concerns to Nike. The election of shop stewards had little effect on the ability of workers to collectively organise themselves and defend their rights vis-à-vis management. Most of these representatives were elected on the basis of friendship/kinship with workers from particular areas/villages in and around Sialkot. They tended to be quite weak and poor, and without the clout to challenge the management on non-compliance with Nike's code of conduct. However, the training of workers in their rights under Pakistani labor law and Nike's code of conduct appeared to raise the awareness of workers in such a way that they spontaneously began to organize strikes when their wages were not paid in full. And the publicizing of such strikes in local media had the potential to help facilitate labor agency in GPNs.
With respect to our theoretical framework, we have highlighted the structural limitations that internationally branded companies face in relation to facilitating labor agency in export-oriented industries. As they are not directly responsible for managing the most intensive labor aspects of production, they not only outsource the financial risks associated with production to their suppliers but also the labor management function which means that workers -instead of turning to Nike for proper payments of their wages -are left to bargain with a supplier firm that receives a relatively small share of the valued added in the GPN for football manufacturing. However, to the extent that internationally branded companies may facilitate labor agency vis-à-vis their own suppliers, it appears that training workers' in their rights is an efficient way of incentivizing them to collectively organize and extract benefits from supplier firms in the GPNs of internationally branded companies.
As such, the various kinds of place-based actors that constitute the horizontal dimension of GPNs become critical to facilitating worker agency.
